Value of Knowledge Book
I'm currently working on a book on the value of knowledge, which will be co-authored with Alan Millar and Adrian Haddock. I've just finished drafting my contribution, which I've posted on my homepage. In case you're interested, here are the links:
Chapter One: The Value Problem for Knowledge (pdf)
Chapter Two: Knowledge and Final Value (pdf)
Chapter Three: Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (pdf)
Chapter Four: Understanding (pdf)
Bibliography (pdf)
Basically, the first chapter sets up the issues and argues that a complete positive response to the value problem for knowledge requires one to show that knowledge has final value. The second chapter considers the best defence of the final value of knowledge--due to what I call 'robust virtue epistemology--and argues that it fails. The third chapter argues for a new account of knowledge that I call anti-luck virtue epistemology, and looks at how this proposal would deal with the value problem for knowledge, given that it cannot offer a complete positive response to that problem. Finally, the last chapter locates understanding in this debate.
I'm hoping to present this material during my visit to UNAM next month, and no doubt I'll make changes in the light of the feedback I get there. I'm also due to present this at an informal workshop in October in Stirling, at which Wayne Riggs will be commentating (and Ernie Sosa, amongst others, will be in attendance). Accordingly, expect this material to change a lot over the coming months (I'll post alerts if I make any changes).
As always, comments welcome!
Chapter One: The Value Problem for Knowledge (pdf)
Chapter Two: Knowledge and Final Value (pdf)
Chapter Three: Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology (pdf)
Chapter Four: Understanding (pdf)
Bibliography (pdf)
Basically, the first chapter sets up the issues and argues that a complete positive response to the value problem for knowledge requires one to show that knowledge has final value. The second chapter considers the best defence of the final value of knowledge--due to what I call 'robust virtue epistemology--and argues that it fails. The third chapter argues for a new account of knowledge that I call anti-luck virtue epistemology, and looks at how this proposal would deal with the value problem for knowledge, given that it cannot offer a complete positive response to that problem. Finally, the last chapter locates understanding in this debate.
I'm hoping to present this material during my visit to UNAM next month, and no doubt I'll make changes in the light of the feedback I get there. I'm also due to present this at an informal workshop in October in Stirling, at which Wayne Riggs will be commentating (and Ernie Sosa, amongst others, will be in attendance). Accordingly, expect this material to change a lot over the coming months (I'll post alerts if I make any changes).
As always, comments welcome!