Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen has kindly drawn my attention to his new PQ paper on the aim of belief. Here's the abstract and link:
Abstract: Does transparency in doxastic deliberation entail a constitutive
norm of correctness governing belief, as Shah and Velleman argue? No,
because this presupposes an implausibly strong relation between normative
judgements and motivation from such judgements, ignores our interest in
truth, and cannot explain why we pay different attention to how much
justification we have for our beliefs in different contexts. An alternative
account of transparency is available: transparency can be explained by the
aim one necessarily adopts in deliberating about whether to believe that p.
To show this, I reconsider the role of the concept of belief in doxastic
deliberation, and I defuse 'the teleologian's dilemma'.
Blackwell Synergy link