Epistemic Value

Thursday, December 06, 2012

CFP: The Gettier Problem at 50

The Gettier Problem at 50 
20th and 21st June, 2013
University of Edinburgh
Eidyn: The Edinburgh Centre for Epistemology, Mind and Normativity
Speakers: Mark Kaplan (Indiana University), Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto), Erik Olsson (Lund Universitat), Duncan Pritchard (University of Edinburgh), Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University), Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford).
Sponsors: The Scots Philosophical Association and the Mind Association.
Topic: Since the publication of Edmund Gettier’s paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” in June of 1963, a central epistemological issue has been the problem – known as the “Gettier problem” – of supplementing or replacing the traditional tripartite theory of knowledge, by developing a theory of the nature of knowledge not subject to counterexamples of  the sort described in that paper.  In addition to a vast literature explicitly devoted to this task, the Gettier problem has impacted numerous other areas: the internalism/externalism debate about epistemic justification, the question of the value of knowledge, and work on epistemic intuitions and philosophical methodology (among other areas).  This conference, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the publication of Gettier’s landmark paper, will bring together leading researchers to reflect on the Gettier problem and its legacy.
Questions to be examined include:
  • Is the Gettier problem in some sense “unsolvable”?  What does this mean for epistemology?  For philosophical methodology more generally?
  • What, if anything, can experimental philosophy tell us about the Gettier problem?
  • In what way, if any, do different people’s intuitions about “Gettier cases” differ?  What explains the difference?
  • What, if anything, do “Gettier cases” have in common?  What, if anything, is their common structure?
  • Does the Gettier problem suggest that the concept of knowledge can’t be analyized?
  • Does the problem suggest that knowledge isn’t more valuable than that which falls short of knowledge (e.g. justified, true belief)?
  • Can other epistemic statuses (understanding, wisdom) be “Gettierized”?
Proceedings: Authors of papers presented at the conference will be invited to submit their papers for consideration for publication in a special issue of Philosophical Studies on “The Gettier Problem at 50: Methodological and Metaphilosophical Issues.”
Submissions: Submissions, in the form of an abstract (of no more than 1,000 words), of a paper to be presented in 45-60 minutes, should be sent to allanhazlett@gmail.com no later than 10th January, 2013.