CFP: The Gettier Problem at 50

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Gettier Problem at 50 

20^th and 21^st June, 2013

University of Edinburgh

Eidyn: The Edinburgh Centre for Epistemology, Mind and Normativity

www.eidyn.org

Speakers: Mark Kaplan (Indiana University), Jennifer Nagel (University of Toronto), Erik Olsson (Lund Universitat), Duncan Pritchard (University of Edinburgh), Ernest Sosa (Rutgers University), Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford).

Sponsors: The Scots Philosophical Association and the Mind Association.

Topic: Since the publication of Edmund Gettier’s paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” in June of 1963, a central epistemological issue has been the problem – known as the “Gettier problem” – of supplementing or replacing the traditional tripartite theory of knowledge, by developing a theory of the nature of knowledge not subject to counterexamples of  the sort described in that paper.  In addition to a vast literature explicitly devoted to this task, the Gettier problem has impacted numerous other areas: the internalism/externalism debate about epistemic justification, the question of the value of knowledge, and work on epistemic intuitions and philosophical methodology (among other areas).  This conference, commemorating the 50^th anniversary of the publication of Gettier’s landmark paper, will bring together leading researchers to reflect on the Gettier problem and its legacy.

Questions to be examined include:

• Is the Gettier problem in some sense “unsolvable”?  What does this mean for epistemology?  For philosophical methodology more generally?
• What, if anything, can experimental philosophy tell us about the Gettier problem?
• In what way, if any, do different people’s intuitions about “Gettier cases” differ?  What explains the difference?
• What, if anything, do “Gettier cases” have in common?  What, if anything, is their common structure?
• Does the Gettier problem suggest that the concept of knowledge can’t be analyized?
• Does the problem suggest that knowledge isn’t more valuable than that which falls short of knowledge (e.g. justified, true belief)?
• Can other epistemic statuses (understanding, wisdom) be “Gettierized”?

Proceedings: Authors of papers presented at the conference will be invited to submit their papers for consideration for publication in a special issue of Philosophical Studies on “The Gettier Problem at 50: Methodological and Metaphilosophical Issues.”

Submissions: Submissions, in the form of an abstract (of no more than 1,000 words), of a paper to be presented in 45-60 minutes, should be sent to allanhazlett@gmail.com no later than 10^th January, 2013.